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Aristotle on Being: an Aristotelian Critique 
of Russell’s Theory of Existence
George Couvalis
Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and percep-
tion independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s 
theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the 
existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic 
collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic 
philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for 
starting with a clear account of ordinary objects rather than immediately reifying 
mathematical objects. He thus allows us to have a coherent account of existence and 
truth, and to easily resist collapsing ontology into epistemology.
1. Introduction
Let me start with a strange question inspired by David Hume. Suppose you experience 
a vivid, coherent, and long lasting hallucination. In your hallucination, there appear 
to be persistent material objects that appear to relate to each other as we would expect 
material objects to relate. It seems as if your best scientific experiments show them 
to be made of scientifically respectable particles. And so on. What is the difference 
between what you experience and a real world?
Note that my question does not appear to be a question about how we tell the 
difference. It seems we may not be able to tell, even though there is a difference. The 
question seems not to be a question in epistemology. Nevertheless, as we will see, 
Hume in his Treatise turns an epistemological claim into an ontological claim to 
answer our question.
2. Hume on Being
Hume says that if we have an idea of existence as such or external existence as such 
(existence outside of our own minds), we must have an idea derived from some 
experienced impression. However, when we conceive of a thing and then conceive of 
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it existing, there is no experienced difference at all. “The idea of existence, then, is the 
very same as the idea of what we conceive to be existent ... That idea, when conjoin’d 
with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it” (Hume, 2007a:48). In a letter 
in which Hume replies anonymously to the critics of his Treatise of Human Nature 
he adds “...the author [Hume] hath said, that we have no general Idea of Existence, 
distinct from every particular Existence” (Hume, 2007b:428).
Hume argues that there is a difference between what we call external existence and 
mere existence, though it is not a difference that has to do with having an experienced 
impression of existence. The clusters of impressions which we call experiences of 
external objects are more systematically connected with each other and with other 
experiences, more durable and more vivid (Hume, 2007a:49). Pretty obviously, the 
vivid and enduring hallucination I described would meet this criterion. On Hume’s 
argument, it must be a perception of external objects.1
Hume’s account of external existence in the Treatise has the implausible conse-
quence that external objects are mere clusters of connected and durable impressions, 
or perhaps of actual and possible connected and durable impressions. Such views 
have been criticised in great detail in the philosophical literature and I do not want 
to criticise them further here. The problem seems to arise from Hume’s assumption 
that if existence is to be a property, it must be an experienceable property possessed 
by every existing object.
3. Russell on Existence
In the early twentieth century Russell, adapting Frege, produced a sophisticated 
account that incorporated some of Hume’s claims. Russell’s account is enormously 
influential. It is now so widely accepted that it might be called “the canonical account” 
of existence. Russell explains existence by saying that any properly understood state-
ment “... exists” has the logical form “there is an x, such that x is a...”. He calls this logical 
form “a propositional function”. As he puts it “[E]xistence is essentially a property of 
a propositional function. It means that the propositional function is true in at least 
one instance. If you say ‘There are unicorns’, that will mean ‘There is an x, such that 
x is a unicorn’” (Russell, 1918:204). The instances that exist are the only items there 
are to pick out and “there is an x such that...” picks them out and attributes predicates 
to them.2
1 The view Hume puts here may not be his own ultimate position. He may have been a realist. In any 
case, Hume changed his mind about the merits of the account in the Treatise in later work. However, 
he never produced a satisfactory account of existence. For details see Bradford, 1983 and Cummins, 
1991. Fred Wilson tries to partly rescue Hume through speculating about Hume’s view of abstract ideas 
(Wilson, 1991). However, even on his interpretation, Hume’s view is wrong.
2 Russell’s view is sometimes described as the view that existence is a second order property, a property of 
properties (Caplan, 2006). However, this is not correct. Russell explicitly says that existence is a property 
of a propositional function, which is not a property. Further, being a unicorn cannot be a property, for 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
ARISTOTLE ON BEING: AN ARISTOTELIAN CRITIQUE OF RUSSELL’S THEORY OF EXISTENCE
43
In giving reasons for adopting the canonical account, Russell denies that “existence” 
is an ordinary predicate. He argues that existence cannot be some property that all 
things individually necessarily possess because if a thing with some property can be 
picked out it must already exist. Further, a property all individuals necessarily possess 
cannot be a real property (Russell, 1918:204–5). In explaining this through a joke, he 
comments that “... it is obvious that, if you think of the things there are in the world, 
they cannot be divided into two classes — namely those that exist and those that do 
not. Non-existence is, in fact, a very rare property. Everyone knows the story of the 
two German pessimistic philosophers of whom one exclaimed: ‘How much happier 
were it never to have been born’. To which the other replied with a sigh: ‘True! But 
how few are those who achieve this happy lot’” (Russell, 1956:147).
Having explained the reasons Russell later gave in favour of the canonical account, 
let me point out that it is clear that his initial reason for adopting it is that it would 
allow mathematical objects to be respectable existents. While he is an empiricist 
rather like Hume about the objects of science and perception, Russell holds that logic 
and mathematics are in some sense telling us about another kind of real object. In 
a 1905 paper, Russell argues that “exists” has two distinct senses. In the first sense, 
it is predicated of individuals and is standardly used in every day life, as when we 
say that Hamlet does not exist or that Socrates existed. The second sense, which he 
says is only used of the objects dealt with in symbolic logic such as numbers, is the 
sense he made canonical. Russell barely bothers to discuss the first sense in 1905, 
and it is clear that he thinks it is of little interest (Russell, 1905). By the time he wrote 
the work we are discussing, he had come to think that the second sense is the only 
coherent sense of “exists” and is applying it to talk of unicorns. Russell’s motives in 
dropping the first sense of existence are clarified in a 1913 manuscript in which he 
discusses Hume’s account of existence and claims that “[S]o long as it was thought 
that “existence” ... could be significantly predicated of an actual given particular, 
it was impossible to answer Hume’s contention that existence adds nothing to the 
subject...” (Russell, 1913:138–139).
The canonical account can be used to deal easily with an ancient problem raised 
by Parmenides, which is: how can we talk about non-existent objects? If you talk 
about them it seems they must exist. Following Russell, we can say that we don’t talk 
about them. We instead talk about things (instances) and truly or falsely predicate 
something of at least one of them. The claim that some kind of thing does not exist 
is made true by no instance bearing that predicate. Unlike Hume, Russell can explain 
very simply how we can think of something that does not exist and, indeed, think 
that it does not exist.
unicorns do not exist, so the property of being a unicorn does not exist. Russell formulates a theory 
of the meaning of “exist” that is in part intended to explain how we can meaningfully state something 
false when our propositional function apparently refers to a non-existent property. He explains this by 
saying that such propositional functions are formed by concatenating names of existent properties in 
a logical construction. The details are not relevant here.
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Russell’s canonical account is more sophisticated than Hume’s. However, as he 
provides us with no explanation of what it is to be an instance, it is difficult to see 
how he could produce a principled account that rules out (or rules in) the contents 
of hallucinations as existents. Further, in what we have discussed there is no account 
of external existence.
Russell gives an account of external existence that is not very different from that 
of Hume in the Treatise. He thinks that phantoms and images are not fundamentally 
different from external objects except that “[I]f you shut your eyes and imagine a visual 
scene and you stretch out your hand to touch what is imaged, you won’t get a tactile 
sensation, or even necessarily a tactile image. You will not get the usual correlation of 
sight and touch... The general correlations of your images are quite different from what 
one chooses to call ‘real’ objects. But that is not to say that such images are unreal, it 
is only to say that they are not part of physics”. He goes on to give a similar account of 
Macbeth’s dagger: “Macbeth sees a dagger. If he tried to touch it, he would not get any 
tactile sensation, but that does not imply he was not seeing a dagger, it only implies 
that he was not touching it. It does not in any way imply that the visual impression 
was not there” (Russell, 1918:224).
Russell’s view of external existents is a form of neutral monism in which the view 
of one perceiver is supplemented by the views of others, and in which psychological 
phenomena are explained by different laws to physical phenomena. Nevertheless, 
the components of the psychological and the physical world are the same kind of 
thing — this is why neutral monism is a monism. On Russell’s account the compo-
nents of the world are actual and possible sense-data, which are strikingly like Hume’s 
impressions.3 He embraces neutral monism because he rejects as spooky the view 
that mental states are directed to objects that exist in some separate world — the 
view that Macbeth’s dagger exists separately from Macbeth’s experience because it is 
an object of Macbeth’s thought. By contrast to the supposedly spooky view, neutral 
monism does not radically distinguish between the object of an experience and an 
experience — it seems more scientific and less mysterious (Grayling, 2003:461–2). As 
we have seen, it also does not radically distinguish between psychological existents 
and physical existents.4
While Russell’s account is an advance on that of Hume, he ends up in an implau-
sible neutral monism that is subject to the same sorts of objections as Hume’s empiri-
cism. I do not want to repeat criticisms of neutral monism here. It is sufficient to 
note that it is difficult to avoid neutral monism or something like it when we assume 
3 Nicholas Griffin has denied that neutral monism is like phenomenalism because neutral monism 
includes unsensed sensibilia and spatially located sense-data (Griffin, 2003:30). However, Humean 
phenomenalism arguably also includes unsensed but possible impressions, and Hume argues that spatial 
relations are constructed out of relations between impressions. So the difference is trivial.
4 I am oversimplifying in the above discussion. Although Russell was sympathetic to neutral monism 
when he wrote Russell, 1918, he did not subscribe to it until soon after. He then substituted “percepts” 
for “sense-data”.
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that external existents cannot have anything in common which makes them external 
existents. Russell also ends up very implausibly putting the objects of mathematics 
and logic on a par with ordinary external existents through a logician’s device when 
he uses the notion of a propositional function to explain all talk of existence. Perhaps 
a case can be made that mathematical and logical objects exist in some sense of “exist”. 
However, the starting point in an account of existence should be a plausible account 
of the paradigmatic examples of existents, external existents.
4. Aristotle on Being
Let us return to my strange question. We will see that Aristotle does not think it can 
be answered through epistemology. He thinks it is a question about being. Indeed, 
Aristotle defines metaphysics as ontology, which he calls “episteme tis he theorie to 
on he on”, which means the science which studies being qua being (1003a1).
We can glean Aristotle’s answer to my question from his criticism of Protogaras’ 
view that all appearances are true in book Gamma of Metaphysics. He there contrasts 
his view which says some things are “auta kath’ auta”, things which are what they are 
through themselves (literally, themselves through themselves), with Protagoras’ view 
which “apanta poeii ta onta pros ti”, makes all things relative to perception (literally, 
makes all beings relative) (1011a18–21). (Protagaras, who was an extreme empiri-
cist, can be plausibly taken to be an intellectual ancestor of Hume and Russell.) In 
context, it is clear that what Aristotle means is that the world of external existents is 
perceiver independent. The identity of the items in it is given through themselves. By 
contrast, the hallucinated items are not something through themselves — their identity 
is dependent on a perceiver. However, the hallucinated items are represented by the 
perceiver as existing in themselves. The falsity of the representation consists in there 
not being anything represented which exists in itself — that is, Aristotle holds that 
the falsity or truth of representations is to be explained through being, not that being 
is to be explained through the truth or falsity of representations. This is particularly 
obvious in his account of truth and falsity in Metaphysics Theta 10.
In Theta 10, Aristotle lists truth and falsity as one of the three key ways in which 
something is said to be. He then presents the view that being true is derivative from 
being and not from thinking (or, presumably, experiencing). He illustrates his view 
by remarking that “... it is not because of our truly thinking you to be pale that you 
are pale, but is rather because you are pale that we who say this speak the truth”.5 
Aristotle’s definitions of truth and falsity in book Gamma of Metaphysics are also in 
terms of being (to on) 1011b26–29.
Aristotle might be thought to be stating the theory of truth produced by the logi-
cian Tarski, according to which the statement or representation “P” is true if and 
only if P. However, it is clear from remarks in Metaphysics that he is also committed 
5 Makin, 2006’s excellent translation of 1051b8–10.
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to the stronger claim that “P” is true if and only if there is truth-maker P which is 
independent of what anyone thinks or perceives.6
What is for something to be auto kath’ auto? What is it for something to be a truth-
maker? We might think that Aristotle claimed that there is some obvious property 
that externally existent objects have in common but the objects of representations do 
not. A real dagger has a property that Macbeth’s dagger does not have. This, however, 
does not fit some of the things he says. In Metaphysics Delta he says that the beings in 
themselves are what is signified by the (differing) schemata of the categories of being 
(i.e. quantity, quality etc.) (1017a22–3). In Metaphysics Zeta the point is explained 
when he says that being in itself is said in many ways (“to on legetai pollahos”) and 
lists the categories in which it is said (e.g. of quality, of quantity, substance, and so 
on) (1028a10–13). Does this mean that he claims that the term “being” is equivocal 
and means something different when talking about different categories? Along with 
most commentators, I don’t think so.
In my view Aristotle was in part putting a similar point to that of Hume, which 
is that when we say that something exists, nothing from a specific category is being 
predicated of it. When we say that paleness exists or that weighing five kilograms 
exists, neither of those statements is predicating something from another category of 
them. Existence is not a category, nor does it come under a category. It is not a kind 
of being, like a quality or a quantity. Hence, existence is not a property that can be 
used to pick out instances.
What then is it to be an itself through itself? What is it to be a truth-maker? In 
Book Zeta of Metaphysics and elsewhere Aristotle answers these questions by saying 
that there must be a ti einai of that thing — something that it is to be that thing inde-
pendently of thought or perception. I have pointed out in a previous paper that he 
argues that this means that the thing must have an essence (or consist of things that 
have essences). An essence is a property that defines a thing, and without which it 
cannot exist (Couvalis, 2011). Without essences there cannot be anything that it is to 
be something. This means that when I say something exists, I am asserting that it has 
essential properties or is made up of things that have essential properties. If you like, to 
be is to have the second order property of having essential properties that are independent 
of perceivers.7 The essential properties can belong to various categories of being Aris-
totle describes in Categories. Existence is a property but because it is a second order 
property shared by all things, it is not a property that can be used to pick them out.8
Let us take an example to illustrate Aristotle’s view. Suppose I perceive a cat. To say 
that the cat exists is to say that it has the essential property of being a cat independently 
6 Crivelli has plausibly argued that there are some differences between Aristotle’s theory and modern 
truth-maker theories. For instance Aristotle thinks states of affairs themselves can be true, so that “true” 
does not apply merely to sentences (Crivelli, 2004). This is not relevant here.
7 My account is inspired by Hintikka, 2004.
8 The view of being I ascribe to Aristotle is similar to the view William of Ockham defends (Ockham, 
1957:90–94; Pelletier, 2012:99–101).
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of my perception. By contrast, if I hallucinate a cat, the object of my false represen-
tation has no essential properties. The cat content is, as Aristotle would put it, pros 
ti — relative to something. Presumably it is relative to a perceiver. (Of course, my 
representation may itself have an essential property that makes it a representation. It 
may also have an essential property that makes it a representation of a cat. However, 
that is a different essential property.)
The reader may be puzzled by the fact that Aristotle seems to elsewhere say that only 
substances (ousiai) have essences. In Book Zeta he says that although the focal mean-
ing of essence means that only substances have essences, other items, such as those in 
various categories, have an essence; though not in an unqualified way (1030a 17–27). 
I take it that he means by this that a quality or a quantity is a property of some other 
thing that is not a quantity or a quality (e.g. of a man). However, being a man is not 
a property of anything else.9 Further, substance essences are causally explanatory in 
themselves for Aristotle whereas quality or quantity essences are not causally explana-
tory in themselves as they are modes of being of substances.
Note the difference from Hume. Hume assumes that if there is to be an intrinsic 
difference between objects in hallucinations and real objects there must be experi-
encable differences between them. If being in itself is a property (or defined in terms 
of properties), it must be experiencable. A property like having essential properties 
that are independent of how they are conceived or perceived is ruled out by Hume’s 
collapsing of ontology into an empiricist epistemology. Hume cannot canvas the pos-
sibility that being might be a second order property of properties.
Of course, Russell’s account is considerably more sophisticated than Hume’s because 
it introduces the notion of a propositional function. We might think that if the prob-
lems introduced by Russell’s neutral monism could be overcome, his account would 
be fine. However, Aristotle would argue that Russell’s propositional function account 
of what it is to be fails to deal with the central question, which is to explain what it 
is for a purported property to be instantiated. For Aristotle, if such an account is 
not to be empty, it must rely on a pre-existing notion of being which is built into the 
notion of an instance. That is one of the points underlying his account of truth. So, 
for Aristotle, Russell’s account would be circular.
5. Conclusion
A sense of “exists” Russell introduced to make sense of logical talk about strange 
entities such as numbers has become the only sense that many analytic philoso-
phers think is coherent. This reflects a tendency introduced by Russell into analytic 
philosophy to pretend to scientific naturalism while being a radical empiricist with 
Platonic leanings. The tendency is Platonic in that it takes supposedly precise and 
9 I follow the interpretation of Bostock, 1994:92–93, without endorsing his criticism of Aristotle at 
Bostock, 1994:94.
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well-defined ways of talking about abstract objects to be the proper guide to talking 
about existence in general.
The influential empiricist philosopher Quine is an exemplar of this tendency, 
despite his many attempts to escape from the Platonic tendencies of past philosophy. 
In his paper “On What There Is”, one of his central obsessions is logical and math-
ematical existence (Quine, 1948). He accepts the canonical account without serious 
argument but quibbles about specific cases. His detailed arguments for the existence 
of some things and against the existence of others there and elsewhere are nota-
ble because they discuss in considerable detail epistemological criteria for deciding 
whether something exists, such as simplicity in accounting for experience. However, 
the apparent clarity and precision of Quine’s version of the canonical account rests on 
sheer evasiveness about the notion of an instance. Unlike Hume, he does not explicitly 
collapse ontology into epistemology, but he implicitly does so. He also discards the 
notion of an essence. Aristotle would have thought that like Hume, Quine is unable 
to give a plausible account of the central case of existence, external existence. All he 
can do is talk about epistemological criteria for deciding whether some propositional 
functions are instantiated. Further, Aristotle would have thought that Quine ren-
ders it utterly unclear what it is for some claim to be true as Quine’s account seems 
incapable of yielding an adequate theory of truth. As Quine thinks that things do 
not have essences independently of our descriptions of them he is unable to give a 
plausible account of what it is for some claim to be true (Book Theta of Metaphysics 
makes clear that Aristotle thinks that to explicate “to be true” we must first have an 
adequate account of what it is to be something).
More modern debates about existence in analytic philosophy are plagued by a 
related problem. One debate beloved by the logically minded is the debate initiated 
by Meinong as to whether the objects of intentional states exist.10 All kinds of strange 
considerations about what we logically quantify over have been introduced to deal 
with such cases. However, these debates rely on no clear account of what existence is 
in the central case of external existence. They often assume the claim that things like 
numbers exist can be clearly understood and then go on to extrapolate to other cases. 
Obscurantist talk that masquerades as explanatory is introduced.
By contrast to the tendency introduced by Russell into analytic philosophy, Aris-
totle’s account of existence starts by affirming the primacy of the sense of “exists” 
involved in external existence. He takes over Plato’s jargon (auto kath’ auto, ousia etc.) 
but he subverts it to make the world of everyday perception and science primary in 
discussing existence and not the spooky world in which Platonists think mathemati-
cal objects and the like reside.
10 For a brief account of the problems the Meinongian view was meant to address, see Caston, 1998. Caston 
very clearly explains Aristotle’s naturalistic and anti-Meinongian solution to such problems.
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